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8 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

SUBJECT : Comments on DDI Memorandum: NPIC, dated
24 August 1965

1. The DDI memorandum of 24 August 1965 is a considerable improvement over the NPIC replies to the recommendations of the IG Survey. It reflects the results of the much-needed prodding contained in the memorandum of the Executive Director of 9 August 1965. However, it still misses the point as to the urgent need for integration of the efforts of system designers and system product exploiters. Paragraph 12 of the DDI memorandum, in discussing R&D activities and their expansion, takes no cognizance of this vital problem and leaves the reader with the feeling that much of the expansion of the NPIC R&D effort might go forward in a cocoon and run the risk of an art for art's sake approach.

2. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the DDI memorandum give the impression as if the renaming of COMOR Committee and monitoring of the revised committee by the DDI Collection Guidance Staff will resolve the existing problems in the requirements/production fields. On the basis of past experiences, it must be doubted that the CIA position will prevail any more in a COMIREX than a COMOR. Good argument can be adduced against establishing a COMEX in addition to a COMOR and for fusing the functions of both in one committee. However, the difficulties under either system cannot be dealt with in the cavalier manner in which it is done in these two paragraphs.

3. Intimately connected with the preceding is the questionable approach in Paragraph 9 of the memorandum. Under this philosophy the Agency will continue to be vulnerable to attack from other members of the U.S. intelligence community that it is shortchanging its national executive agent role in favor of a difficult-to-defend departmental function. This is all the more true since the DCI, after all, represents a national rather than a departmental institution.

4. In summary, actions based on this memorandum will provide improvements for many of the NPIC problems but no real cure, since

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the memorandum fails to convince that the basic problem of system design versus system product exploitation is understood, and it does not provide for action in this area. Without this and on a high priority basis, the rest of the actions, while not unimportant, cannot achieve their full benefit for NPIC.



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